Презентация Economics of pricing and decision making. (Lecture 1) онлайн
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Слайды и текст к этой презентации:
№1 слайд
Содержание слайда: ECONOMICS OF PRICING AND DECISION MAKING
Lecture 1
№2 слайд
Содержание слайда: What makes a business successful?
Providing a service that customers like
Building partnerships
Being ahead of competitors
Building brand value
...“Interactions”
with customers, suppliers, competitors, regulators, people within
the firm...
№3 слайд
Содержание слайда: What is game theory?
...a collection of tools for predicting outcomes of a group of interacting agents
... a bag of analytical tools designed to help us understand the phenomena that we observe when decision makers interact (Osborne and Rubinstein)
...the study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision makers (Myerson)
№4 слайд
Содержание слайда: What is game theory?
Study of interactions between parties (e.g. individuals, firms)
Helps us understand situations in which decision makers interact: strategies & likely outcome
Game theory consists of a series of models, often technical as well as intuitive
The models predict how parties are likely to behave in certain situations
№5 слайд
Содержание слайда: The Game:
Strategic Environment
Players
Everyone who has an effect on your earnings (payoff)
Actions:
Choices available to the players
Strategies
Define a plan of action for every contingency
Payoffs
Numbers associated with each outcome
Reflect the interests of the players
№6 слайд
Содержание слайда: Strategic Thinking
Example: Apple vs. Samsung
Apple’s action depends on how Apple predicts Samsung’s action.
Apple’s action depends on how Apple predicts how Samsung predicts the Apple’s action.
Apple’s action depends on how Apple predicts how Samsung predicts how Apple predicts the Samsung’s action.
etc…
№7 слайд
Содержание слайда: The Assumptions
Rationality
Players aim to maximize their payoffs, and are self-interested.
Players are perfect calculators
Players consider the responses/reactions of other players
Common Knowledge
Each player knows the rules of the game
Each player knows that each player knows the rules
Each player knows that each player knows that each player knows the rules
Each player knows that each player knows that each player knows that each player knows the rules
Each player knows that each player knows that each player knows that each player knows that each player knows the rules
...
№8 слайд
Содержание слайда: History of game theory
1928, 1944: John von Neumann
1950: John Nash
1960s: Game theory used to simulate thermonuclear war between the USA and the USSR
1970s: Oligopoly theory
1980s: Game theory used
Evolutionary biology
Political science
More recent applications: Philosophy, computer science
1994, 2005, 2007, 2012: Economics Nobel prize
№9 слайд
Содержание слайда: Lectures
1-3: Simultaneous games
Nash equilibrium
Oligopoly
Mixed strategies
4-5: Sequential games
Subgame perfect equilibrium
Bargaining
6: Repeated games
Two firms interacting repeatedly
№10 слайд
Содержание слайда: Lectures
7: Evolutionary games
How do players “learn” to play the Nash equilibrium
8-9: Incomplete information
Cooperation and coordination with incomplete information
Signaling, and moral hazard.
10: Auctions
Strategies for bidders and sellers
№11 слайд
Содержание слайда: Assessment
Assessment consist is a final exam:
100% exam
2-hour
Section A: 5 compulsory questions, at most 3 "mathematical/analytical" questions. (10 marks each)
Section B: choose 1 essay question from a list of 2. (50 marks)
№12 слайд
Содержание слайда: SIMULTANEOUS GAMES WITH DISCRETE CHOICES
Pure strategy Nash Equilibrium
№13 слайд
Содержание слайда: Simultaneous games with discrete choices
A game is simultaneous when players
choose their actions at the same time
or, choose their actions in isolation, without knowing what the other players do
Discrete choices: the set of possible actions is finite
e.g. {yes,no}; {a,b,c}.
Opposite of continuous choices: e.g. choose any number between 0 and 1.
№14 слайд
Содержание слайда: Strategic Interaction
Players: Reynolds and Philip Morris
Payoffs: Companies’ profits
Strategies: Advertise or Not Advertise
Strategic Landscape:
Each firm initially earns $50 million from its existing customers
Advertising costs a firm $20 million
Advertising captures $30 million from competitor
Simultaneous game with discrete choices
№15 слайд
Содержание слайда: Representing a Game
(strategic form / normal form)
What is the likely outcome?
We want a “stable”, “rational” outcome.
№16 слайд
Содержание слайда: Solving the game:
Nash equilibrium
The Nash equilibrium, is a set of strategies, one for each player, such that no player has incentive to unilaterally change his action
The NE describes a stable situation.
Nash equilibrium: likely outcome of the game when players are rational
Each player is playing his/her best strategy given the strategy choices of all other players
No player has an incentive to change his or her action unilaterally
№17 слайд
Содержание слайда: Solving the Game
Can (No Ad,No Ad) be a Nash equilibrium?
No, 60>50
Can (No Ad,Ad) be a Nash equilibrium?
No: 30>20
Can (Ad,No Ad) be a Nash equilibrium?
No: 30>20
№18 слайд
Содержание слайда: Solving the Game
Can (Ad,Ad) be a Nash equilibrium?
YES: 30>20
If Philip Morris “believes” that Reynolds will choose Ad, it will also choose Ad.
If Reynolds “believes” that Philip Morris will choose Ad, it will also choose Ad.
(Ad, Ad) is a “stable” outcome, neither player will want to change action unilaterally.
№19 слайд
Содержание слайда: Equilibrium vs. optimal outcome
The optimal outcome is the one that maximizes the sum of all players’ payoffs. (No Ad, No Ad)
The NE does not necessarily maximize total payoff. (Ad,Ad). The NE is individually rational, but not always collectively rational.
№20 слайд
Содержание слайда: Game of cooperation (prisoner’s dilemma)
№21 слайд
Содержание слайда: Nash equilibrium existence
Q: Does a NE always exist?
A: Yes (in almost every cases). [If there is no equilibrium with pure strategies, there will be one with mixed strategies.]
Theorem (Nash, 1950)
“There exists at least one Nash equilibrium in any finite games in which the numbers of players and strategies are both finite.”
№22 слайд
Содержание слайда: Nash equilibrium
A formal definition
Any social problem can be formalized as a “game,” consisting of three elements:
Players: i=1,2,…,N
i’s Strategy:
i’s Payoff:
№23 слайд
Содержание слайда: Nash equilibrium
A formal definition
Definition: A Nash Equilibrium is a profile of strategies such that each player’s strategy is an optimal response to the other players strategies:
If all players play according to the NE, no player has any incentive to change his action unilaterally.
Why is the NE the most likely outcome:
Any other outcome is not “stable”.
In the long term, players learn how to play and always select the NE
№24 слайд
Содержание слайда: How to find the Nash equilibrium?
There are two techniques to find the NE
Successive elimination of dominated strategies
Best response analysis
№25 слайд
Содержание слайда: Elimination of dominated strategies (1st method)
Procedure: eliminate, one by one, the strategies that are strictly dominated by at least one other strategy.
Consider two strategies, A and B. Strategy A strictly dominates Strategy B if the payoff of Strategy A is strictly higher than the payoff of Strategy B no matter what opposing players do.
For Philip Morris, Ad dominates No Ad: π(Ad,any)> π(No Ad,any). For Reynolds Ad also dominates No Ad.
Strictly dominated strategies can be eliminated, they would not be chosen by rational players.
No Ad can be eliminated for both players.
№26 слайд
Содержание слайда: Elimination of dominated strategies
№27 слайд
Содержание слайда: Elimination of dominated strategies
The order in which strategies are eliminated does not matter. Select any player, any strategy, and check whether it is strictly dominated by any other strategy. If it is strictly dominated, eliminate it.
When several strategies are strictly dominated, it does not matter which one you eliminate first.
№28 слайд
Содержание слайда: Elimination of dominated strategies
№29 слайд
Содержание слайда: Elimination of dominated strategies
№30 слайд
Содержание слайда: Weak dominance
Strategy A weakly dominates strategy B if its strategy A’s payoff is in some cases higher (>) and in some cases equal () to strategy B’s payoff.
Alternative scenario:
One strategy weakly dominates the other
60>50
30=30
№31 слайд
Содержание слайда: Weak dominance
Weakly dominated strategies cannot be eliminated.
In some cases, when strategies are only weakly dominated, successive elimination can get eliminate some Nash equilibria.
№32 слайд
Содержание слайда: Best response analysis (2nd method)
№33 слайд
Содержание слайда: Best response analysis
№34 слайд
Содержание слайда: Exercise
№35 слайд
Содержание слайда: Comparing the two methods
The two methods for finding the NE are NOT equivalent.
The best response analysis is fully reliable, and always finds the NE.
Sometimes, the elimination of dominated strategies will fail to find the NE. This may happen when that are more than one NE.
№36 слайд
Содержание слайда: Comparing the two methods
Example of an entry game:
Two businesses must choose which market to enter.
This is a game of coordination (not cooperation!): class of games with multiple NE (two in this case).
№37 слайд
Содержание слайда: Comparing the two methods
1st method: The game is not dominance solvable, there are no dominated strategies.
2nd method: With best response analysis, both equilibria are found.
When best-response analysis of a discrete strategy game
does not find a Nash equilibrium, then the game has no
equilibrium in pure strategies.
№38 слайд
Содержание слайда: Summary
What is game theory
Game representation
Nash equilibrium as the likely outcome of the game
Finding the NE: dominance vs. best response
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