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Слайды и текст к этой презентации:
№4 слайд
Содержание слайда: Terminology and auction types
Terminology:
Bids B,
Bidder’s valuation V,
Next-highest rival bid R
Small in/decrement in current highest bid: e
Classifying auctions:
Open or sealed
Multiple or single bids
Ascending or descending
First-price or second-price
Private or common-value
№5 слайд
Содержание слайда: Sources of uncertainty
Private Value Auction
Bidders differ in their values for the object
e.g., memorabilia, consumption items
Each bidder knows only his value for the object
Common Value Auction
The item has a single though unknown value
Bidders differ in their estimates of the true value of the object
e.g. drilling for oil
№10 слайд
Содержание слайда: Dutch auction for British CO2 emissions
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme Auction, United Kingdom, 2002.
UK government aimed to spend £215 million to get firms reduce CO2 emissions.
Clock auction used to determine what price to pay per unit, which firms to reward.
The clearing price was £53.37 per metric ton.
№20 слайд
Содержание слайда: Revenue Equivalence
All 4 standard auction formats yield the same expected revenue
Any auctions in which:
The prize always goes to the person with the highest valuation
A bidder with the lowest possible valuation expects zero surplus
…yield the same expected revenue
The seller is indifferent between the 4 standard auctions.
№22 слайд
Содержание слайда: Are all auctions truly equivalent?
For sellers, all 4 standard auctions are theoretically equivalent. However, this may not be the case if bidders are risk-averse or inexperienced.
Risk Aversion
Does not affect the outcomes of 2nd price auctions and English auctions.
However, in 1st price auctions and Dutch auctions, risk-averse bidders are more aggressive than risk-neutral bidders. Bidders ‘shade’ less, so bid higher than if risk-neutral!
Risk aversion 1st price or Dutch are better for the seller, because bidders shade less.
№23 слайд
Содержание слайда: Are all auctions truly equivalent?
Inexperienced bidders
In second-price auctions, it is optimal to bid V.
Inexperienced bidders tend to overbid in 2nd price auctions (B>V), in order to increase their odds of winning.
With inexperienced bidders second-price auctions increase the revenue of the seller.
№24 слайд
Содержание слайда: Collusion in auctions
In second-price auctions, bidders may agree not to bid against a designated winner.
e.g. there are 10 bidders, John’s valuation is $20, others have valuation of $18.
Bidders agree that the designated winner John bids any amount more than $18, others bid $0 - no incentive for anyone to do differently. The bidder wins the item for $0.
In first-price auctions, instead, if John bids $18, he pays $18 to the seller.
№25 слайд
Содержание слайда: Collusion in auctions
Collusion is also possible in English auctions. Bidders may be able to signal their true valuations the way that they bid in early stages.
Bidders who realize that they do not have the highest valuations may collude with the Vmax bidder by accepting not to raise their bid.
№29 слайд
Содержание слайда: The European 3G telecom auctions
The 2000-2001 European auctions of 3G mobile telecommunication licenses were some of the largest in history. The total revenue raised was above $100bn, with enormous variations between countries.
UK
5 licences; 4 incumbents. At least one new entrant would win a license.
Used English auction. New entrants knew they had a chance so they bid aggressively, forcing incumbents to do the same.
Revenue: 39bn euros.
№30 слайд
Содержание слайда: The European 3G telecom auctions
Netherlands
4 licences; 4 incumbents.
Potential entrants could not realistically compete with the incumbents. Therefore they decided to collude with them. They let them win against compensation.
Used English auction. Raised only 3bn euros.
Another problem is the sequencing. Because the auction took place after the UK one, bidders had learned how to collude.
The same problem occurred in countries that organized auctions later, e.g. Italy and Switzerland. Bidders had learned how to collude.
№31 слайд
Содержание слайда: Common Value Auctions
Common Value Auction
The item has a single though unknown value, and bidders differ in their estimates.
Example: Oil drilling lease
Value of oil is roughly the same for every participant.
No bidder knows for sure how much oil there is.
Each bidder has some information.
№35 слайд
Содержание слайда: Dealing with the winner’s curse
Given that I win an auction …All others bid less than me …Thus the true value must be lower than I thought.
Winning the auction is “bad news”. One must incorporate this into one’s bid, i.e. lower your bid. Assume that your estimate is the most optimistic.
№36 слайд
Содержание слайда: Avoiding the winner’s curse
Bidding with no regrets:
Since winning means you have the most optimistic signal, always bid as if you had the highest signal, i.e. lower your bid.
If your estimate is the most optimistic –what is the item worth?
Use that as the basis of your bid.
№37 слайд
Содержание слайда: All-pay auctions
Common value first-price auction in which bidders pays the amount of their bid, even if they lose.
Example 1: Olympic games
Competing cities spend vast amount of resources to win the vote.
Example 2: Political contests (elections)
Candidates spend time and money, whether they win or lose.
In the 2012 US presidential election, total campaign spending was close to $2bn.
№38 слайд
Содержание слайда: All-pay auctions
Example 3: Research and development, patent race.
Competing pharmaceutical firms search for a new treatment/molecule; only one winner.
Investment in R&D is risky, since even losers lose their “bid”.
Bid is useless unless you win…hence bid aggressively or don’t bid at all.
Typically, the sum of the bids is much higher than the value of the prize, which is good for the seller.
№42 слайд
Содержание слайда: All-pay auctions
Equilibrium
When n=2, players play each value of x with equal probability.
P(x)=x choose each x with equal probability
Expected profit: 1*x-x=0
As n increases, bidders bid lower.
For n=3, P(x)=√x
E.g. x=1/4 P(x)=1/2, i.e. the probability to bid less than ¼ is ½.
The higher is n, the less likely bidders are to win, and the lower they bid.
№43 слайд
Содержание слайда: All-pay auctions
Overbidding
Class experiments: Auction of a $20 bill
Students start bidding $3, $4…
When the price approaches $20, the bidders realize that they could end up having to pay a lot of money and not win.
If you had bid $19, and another bidder bids $20. What would you do? Is it better to bid $21 or pay $19 for nothing?
These games routinely end with the winning bid being 50 percent higher than the value of the prize.
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