Презентация Evolutionary games. (Lecture 7) онлайн
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Слайды и текст к этой презентации:
№1 слайд
Содержание слайда: LECTURE 7
EVOLUTIONARY GAMES
№2 слайд
Содержание слайда: Classic game theory
Lectures 1-6: “Classic game theory”, rational players:
Players aim to maximize their payoffs, and they never make mistakes.
Critiques of CGT:
The assumption that players never make mistakes is unrealistic. To determine the optimal strategy may be difficult in many situations.
How do we choose between the different equilibria? (e.g. coordination games have 2 PSNE and 1 MSNE)
№3 слайд
Содержание слайда: Evolutionary game theory
An Alternative approach
Evolutionary game theory is an alternative approach:
players are not fully rational, they make mistakes.
Players’ behavior evolves overtime, systematic mistakes are eliminated in the long-run.
What EGT achieves:
Helps select between several Nash equilibria
Provides an interpretation to the concept of mixed strategy
№4 слайд
Содержание слайда: Evolution in biology
Principles of evolution
Animal behavior may be genetically predetermined, e.g. degree of aggressivity.
Heterogeneity: different members of a group behave differently.
Fitness: Some types of behavior are more successful.
Selection: Animals pass their genes to the next generation. Animals with most successful types of behavior reproduce more quickly.
e.g. if aggressive types are more successful, they will spread and eventually all animals within that species will be aggressive.
№5 слайд
Содержание слайда: Evolution in game theory
Animal = Player
Behavior = Strategy (not a choice variable)
Behavior success = Payoff of strategy
Successful strategies will spread by imitation or learning
Firms observe which business practices work, and adopt them.
e.g. if TFT dominates defect, then defectors will not survive in the long-term; and they will be replaced by TFT players.
№6 слайд
Содержание слайда: Price competition
Two firms compete on prices. The NE is to set low prices to gain market shares.
№7 слайд
Содержание слайда: Price competition
Review of the pricing game
Prisoner’s dilemma situation. A unique PSNE: (D,D).
If the game is not repeated, cooperation cannot be sustained.
If the game is repeated infinitely or indefinitely, cooperation may be sustained as long as the rate of return r is not too high.
Classic game theory assumes that players make an informed choice to play cooperate (C) or defect (D) based on the payoffs.
№8 слайд
Содержание слайда: Player types
EGT assumes that players have no choice between C and D. Each player is born with a predetermined trait.
Suppose that there are two types of players:
Cooperators (probability x).
Defectors (1-x).
Cooperators always cooperate; defectors always defect.
Each player is “born” with a type.
Suppose that players are randomly matched.
The “other player” could be a cooperator or a defector.
№9 слайд
Содержание слайда: Defectors are successful
Expected payoff of cooperators:
π(C)=324x+216(1-x) = 216+108x
Expected payoff of defectors:
π (D)=360x+288(1-x) = 288+72x
π (D)-π (C)=72-36x
π (D)>π (C) defectors have a higher payoff
№10 слайд
Содержание слайда: ESS (evolutionary stable strategy)
Thus, defectors are fitter than cooperators.
This leads to an increase in the proportion of defectors from one “generation” to the next.
E.g. suppose that x=0.4 initially. The proportion of defectors will increase gradually, as defection is more successful. At some point all players will adopt defection.
The evolutionary stable strategy is the long-run outcome of the evolution process. The ESS is that all players defect. Only one type will remain.
When a strategy is strictly dominant, it is the ESS.
№11 слайд
Содержание слайда: ESS
The likely outcome is (D,D)
Why do firms defect?
Not because they choose to defect, but because those that don’t defect have a lower rate of survival
№12 слайд
Содержание слайда: ESS
№13 слайд
Содержание слайда: Repeated prisoners’ dilemma
Suppose the game is repeated three times.
Each pair of players plays the games 3 times in succession.
Is cooperation possible?
When the game is repeated, players can have more complex strategies. Suppose there are two types of strategies:
Always defect (probability 1-x)
Tit-for-tat (probability x)
Players are randomly drawn against each other.
№14 слайд
Содержание слайда: Repetition: payoffs
A vs. A: 288+288+288
T vs. T: 324+324+324
A vs. T: 360+288+288
T vs. A: 216+288+288
№15 слайд
Содержание слайда: Repetition: Nash equilibrium
Classic game theory. Suppose that players must decide in advance either T or A. Two pure strategy NE: {A,A}, {T,T}
One mix strategy NE:
Play A with probability p=1/3:
864p+936(1-p)=792p+972(1-p)
Play T with probability 1-p=2/3
3 possible outcomes.
№16 слайд
Содержание слайда: Repetition: performance
EGT expected payoffs:
π(A)= 936x+864(1-x) = 864+72x
π(T)= 972x+792(1-x) = 792+180x
π(T)> π(A) if x>2/3
π(T)< π(A) if x<2/3
The performance of each type depends on the composition of the population
Large % of type A A is more successful
Large % of type T T is more successful
№17 слайд
Содержание слайда: Repetition: performance
№18 слайд
Содержание слайда: Repetition: ESS
If more than 2/3 of the population is T type, then T players are more successful, and their proportion will grow until it reaches 100%
If less than 2/3 of the population is T type, then A players are more successful, and their proportion will grow until it reaches 100%
Two ESS: All A or all T
№19 слайд
Содержание слайда: Repetition: ESS
“Monomorphic” outcome: all of the type.
If everyone else is type A, types that don’t defect will not survive. If everyone else is type T, types that do defect will not survive.
EGT can help select from a multiplicity of NE.
In this example, only the PSNE are evolutionary stable, the MSNE is not.
Thus, we can eliminate the MSNE on the ground that it is not evolutionary stable.
Importance of the initial population mix of types.
№20 слайд
Содержание слайда: Repetition: ESS
№21 слайд
Содержание слайда: n-repetitions
π(T)> π(A) if
324nx+(216+288(n-1))(1-x)>(360+288(n-1))x+288n(1-x)
i.e. if x>2/n
№22 слайд
Содержание слайда: n-repetitions
There are two ESS, one all T, one all A.
The cut-off point depends on n: the higher n, the more likely that T types prevail.
As n very large, the cut-off point converges to x=0.
Intuition:
when the game is repeated more times, the long term benefits of cooperation outweigh the short term benefit of defection.
Cooperation is more likely to be evolutionary stable if the
game is repeated many times.
№23 слайд
Содержание слайда: ESS vs. Nash equilibrium
Two PSNE: They Correspond to ESS.
An ESS must be a NE of the game played by
rational players
№24 слайд
Содержание слайда: ESS vs. Nash equilibrium
Backdoor justification for the NE
Even if players are not rational, if the more successful strategies spread in the population, then the outcome must be the same as that resulting from consciously rational play.
Thus, the NE can be reached even if players are not rational. Players who don’t play the successful strategy will die out.
№25 слайд
Содержание слайда: ESS vs. Nash equilibrium
One mixed strategy NE in which T is played with probability 2/3, and A 1/3: Does not correspond to ESS. The mixed strategy NE is “unstable”.
Although all ESS are NE, not all NE are ESS.
Number of NE ≥ number of ESS.
№26 слайд
Содержание слайда: Chicken game
Quantity game:
x is the proportion of H type.
π(L)=0(1-x)-1x=-x
π(H)=1(1-x)-2x=1-3x
№27 слайд
Содержание слайда: Chicken game
π(H)> π(L) if x<1/2
H is successful if the proportion of H is less than ½
L is successful if the proportion of L is less than ½
Each type is fitter when it is relatively rare!
If most firms produce less, I am better off producing more.
If most firms produce more, I am better off not producing less.
№28 слайд
Содержание слайда: Chicken game
If x>1/2, L are more successful and x declines
If x<1/2, H are more successful and x increases
The ESS is at x=1/2
The ESS is that 50% of players play H, and 50% play L.
№29 слайд
Содержание слайда: Chicken game
№30 слайд
Содержание слайда: Chicken game
EGT provides an alternative interpretation of mixed strategies:
With rational players, the 50-50 result suggest players randomize each time they play.
In the evolutionary game, each player uses a pure strategy, but different players use different strategies. The distribution of those playing L and those playing H is 50-50.
№31 слайд
Содержание слайда: Summary
Criticism of classic game theory: rationality; multiple equilibria;
EGT does not assume rationality, and helps select between multiple NE.
EGT provides a backdoor justification for the NE.
All ESS are NE, not all NE are ESS.
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